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I. Introduction 
Corporate law—in theory, in statute, and in practice—is 
oriented around the idea of shareholder primacy.1 A sizeable and 
prestigious swath of the corporate law academy has adopted 
shareholder wealth maximization as the field’s normative 
touchstone,2 uses finance-based law and economics as the field’s 
                                                                                                     
 * Callis Family Professor, Saint Louis University School of Law; Visiting 
Professor, Harvard Law School (Fall 2016). This essay was presented as part of 
the 2016 Lara D. Gass Annual Symposium on Corporate Law, Governance, and 
Purpose: A Tribute to the Scholarship of Lyman Johnson and David Millon. I am 
indebted to Lyman and David for their rich contributions to corporate law 
literature, their comments on my presentation, and their advice and support 
during my career. My thanks to the Law Review editors, particularly Mitchell 
Diles, McNair Nichols, and James Simon. And this essay has benefited from 
thoughts and comments from Ron Colombo, Andrew Gold, Brett McDonnell, 
Andrew Johnston, Harwell Wells, and David Yosifon.  
 1. See D. Gordon Smith, The Shareholder Primacy Norm, 23 J. CORP. L. 277, 
280 (1998) (“The shareholder primacy norm is considered fundamental to 
corporate law.”). 
2. See David Millon, Radical Shareholder Primacy, 10 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 
1013, 1014 (2013) (noting that “proponents of radical shareholder 
primacy . . . include most of the biggest names in the corporate law academy”). 
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primary methodology,3 and employs share-price-oriented event 
studies to assess the success and failure of various corporate law 
doctrines empirically.4 In contrast, progressive corporate law has 
provided resistance to the law and economics movement, has 
drawn upon alternative disciplines for its research and analysis, 
and seeks to move beyond shareholder primacy to a 
communitarian vision of the corporation.5 In so doing, progressive 
corporate law has provided an important intellectual 
counterweight to the predominant paradigm. 
Ultimately, however, progressive corporate law must change 
if it is to continue to provide shareholder primacy with a robust 
academic alternative. In many ways, progressive theory remains 
trapped in the dialectic with corporate law and economics that 
began in the 1980s.6 Thus far, it has not won the argument.7 My 
recommendations are for significant changes in the literature upon 
which progressive corporate law draws; changes in the conception 
                                                                                                     
 3. See Roberta Romano, After the Revolution in Corporate Law, 55 J. LEGAL 
EDUC. 342, 345–46 (2005) [hereinafter Romano, After the Revolution] (describing 
the “revolution” of modern finance becoming a cornerstone methodology in the 
study of corporate law). 
 4. See Jill E. Fisch, Measuring Efficiency in Corporate Law: The Role of 
Shareholder Primacy, 31 J. CORP. L. 637, 639 (2006) (“An increasing number of 
scholars in law, economics, finance, and related fields are using event studies, 
regression analysis, and other statistical tools to evaluate the effect of corporate 
law on firm value.”). 
 5. See David Millon, Communitarianism in Corporate Law: Foundations 
and Law Reform Strategies, in PROGRESSIVE CORPORATE LAW 1, 3 (Lawrence E. 
Mitchell ed., 1995) [hereinafter Millon, Foundations] (describing “the central 
communitarian tenet” as “the willingness to talk about obligations existing 
independently of consent and a consequent unwillingness to allow bargaining 
power disparities to prevent substantively just outcomes”). 
 6. See David Millon, Communitarians, Contractarians, and the Crisis in 
Corporate Law, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1373, 1389 (1993) [hereinafter Millon, 
Communitarians] (“[G]iven the depth of disagreement [between shareholder 
primacy advocates and communitarians], it should come as no surprise that no 
realistic possibility of compromise has yet emerged . . . . The crisis is here, and we 
should expect it to continue.”). 
 7. For arguments against progressive corporate law from a mainstream 
corporate law perspective, see Stephen M. Bainbridge, Community and Statism: 
A Conservative Contractarian Critique of Progressive Corporate Law Scholarship, 
82 CORNELL L. REV. 856, 903 (1997) (criticizing the progressive agenda as 
“unlikely to make much headway . . . [because] it fails to offer . . . a model for 
predicting human behavior that seems capable of displacing those successfully 
employed by mainstream law and economics scholars . . . [and] its communitarian 
elements . . . run counter to the spirit of a democratic capitalist society”). 
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of the corporation upon which it builds; and changes in the types 
of reforms for which it advocates. In brief, I argue that progressive 
corporate law should draw upon economic literature concerning 
the theory of the firm; should focus on employees and shareholders 
as the true participants in the firm; and should advocate for 
structural changes in corporate governance. These changes will 
likely not be amenable to those who remain comfortable with the 
communitarian, CSR-oriented approach that has characterized 
progressive corporate law. But we are stuck in a rut. Below I 
discuss why progressive corporate law needs to head in new 
directions and how it can do so. 
II. Moving to the Theory of the Firm 
When law and economics burst onto the corporate law scene 
in the 1980s, it had a significant advantage over its doctrinal 
rivals: namely, a rigorous interdisciplinary methodology that could 
be applied to arrive at doctrinal answers.8 In some ways, the 
corporate law and economics revolution was a part of the broader 
law and economics movement that began sweeping the academy in 
the 1970s.9 That revolution—based largely on using the tools of 
microeconomic analysis to resolve legal questions—endeavored to 
reexamine and retheorize all areas of law, from torts and contracts 
to family law and constitutional theory.10 However, corporate law 
had its own tradition of using economics. In 1965, Henry Manne’s 
                                                                                                     
 8. See Romano, After the Revolution, supra note 3, at 342 (“Corporate law is 
a field that underwent as thorough a revolution in the 1980s as can be imagined, 
in scholarship and in practice, methodology, and organization . . . . This 
revolution has produced one of the more interdisciplinary fields of law.”). 
 9. See Jonathan Klick & Francesco Parisi, Functional Law and Economics: 
The Search for Value-Neutral Principles of Lawmaking, in LAW AND ECONOMICS: 
PHILOSOPHICAL ISSUES AND FUNDAMENTAL QUESTIONS 104, 105 (Aristides N. 
Hatzis & Nicholas Mercuro eds., 2015) (describing the increased use of economic 
analysis to achieve a better understanding of the legal system that existed in the 
1970s which “gradually exposed the economic structure of basically every aspect 
of a legal system, from its origin and evolution, to substantive, procedural, and 
constitutional rules”). A foundational work in the field is RICHARD A. POSNER, 
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (1972). 
 10. See Klick & Parisi, supra note 9, at 105 (“[T]he incorporations of 
economics into the study of law was to transform traditional legal methodology 
irreversibly.”). 
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article on takeovers introduced the notion of economic concepts to 
challenge existing doctrinal precepts.11 And in 1972—the same 
year as Posner’s first treatise—Victor Brudney and Marvin 
Chirelstein published their casebook on corporate finance.12 
Roberta Romano specifically credits their casebook with 
“introduc[ing] a new methodology, modern finance, into the 
business law curriculum.”13 
Ever since, mainstream corporate law and economics has had 
a rigorous set of interdisciplinary research upon which to draw 
insights about corporate behavior.14 Using economic modeling, 
corporate law academics can work through specific scenarios and 
develop algorithms to resolve questions about likely responses to 
various inputs within the model.15 Models can definitively 
demonstrate that, under certain conditions, one set of actions will 
provide greater efficiency than others.16 In conjunction with these 
models, quantitative analysis of stock prices and other corporate 
economic data can provide empirical results to illuminate 
                                                                                                     
 11. Henry G. Manne, Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control, 73 J. 
POL. ECON. 110 (1965); see George L. Priest, Henry Manne and the Market 
Measure of Intellectual Influence, 50 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 325, 327 (1999) (“Law 
and economics is an intellectual movement and the person most centrally 
responsible for its influence in a market sense is Henry Manne.”). 
 12. VICTOR BRUDNEY AND MARVIN A. CHIRELSTEIN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON 
CORPORATE FINANCE (1972). 
 13. See Romano, After the Revolution, supra note 3, at 345 (“It should also be 
evident that the intellectual roots of modern corporate law scholarship are quite 
distinct from the standard microeconomic methodology applied in the law and 
economics literature.”). 
 14. See Richard A. Posner, Norms and Values in the Economic Approach to 
Law, in LAW AND ECONOMICS: PHILOSOPHICAL ISSUES AND FUNDAMENTAL 
QUESTIONS, supra note 9, at 1, 2 (observing that since the 1970s, “the law and 
economics movement has become geographically, politically, thematically, and 
methodologically diverse—as well as much larger, more specialized, more 
rigorous, more influential, more orthodox”). 
 15. See Thomas J. Miceli & Matthew J. Baker, Introduction to RESEARCH 
HANDBOOK ON ECONOMIC MODELS OF LAW 1 (Thomas J. Miceli & Matthew J. Baker 
eds., 2013) (“The usefulness of [economic] models is that they allow the analyst to 
focus on answering a specific question with respect to a particular legal rule under 
scrutiny, and to derive a clear understanding as to what its effects will be . . . .”). 
 16. See John E. Noyes, An Introduction to Law and Economics by A. Mitchell 
Polinsky, 59 N.Y.U. L. REV. 410, 414 (1984) (“Economic analysis allows clear and 
consistent definitions of terms and formulations of concepts. The resulting models 
appear precise, even elegant. One need apply few tests to determine whether a 
legal rule is a good one; efficiency is the central criterion.”). 
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underlying debates.17 This double methodological punch has 
proven quite powerful in reshaping the corporate law field.18 
The widespread adoption of financial economics and 
corresponding empirical analysis does leave open the opportunity 
for cogent critique. And in fact, progressive corporate law scholars 
have attacked the premise of corporate law and economics—
specifically, shareholder wealth maximization—as well as the 
focus on financial returns to shares as the normative driver for the 
scholarship.19 For the empirical work to match up with the theory, 
the models must aim for shareholder wealth maximization.20 
These premises have been challenged on two fronts. First, a variety 
of commentators have challenged the literature on its own terms 
by arguing that shareholder wealth maximization must be 
measured in the long term.21 Event studies often measure 
                                                                                                     
 17. See Fred S. McChesney, Economics, Law, and Science in the Corporate 
Field: A Critique of Eisenberg, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1530, 1538 (1989) (“In corporate 
law today, relatively simple econometric techniques and the availability of stock-
price data have made it possible to test hypotheses about firm governance and 
performance.”). 
 18. Many corporate law scholars employ both theoretical and empirical tools 
in conducting their research. See Randall S. Thomas, The Increasing Role of 
Empirical Research in Corporate Law Scholarship, 92 GEO. L.J. 981, 982 (2004) 
(discussing the “explosion in the number of theoretical articles that combine 
theoretical and empirical elements”). 
 19. See, e.g., Millon, Communitarians, supra note 6, at 1373–74 (“[T]he 
orthodox assumption [about corporate law’s normative foundations] has been that 
corporate law’s objective is to . . . maximize shareholder wealth . . . . [This vision] 
disregards claims of various nonshareholder constituencies . . . whose interests 
may be adversely affected by managerial pursuit of shareholder 
welfare . . . [which] is corporate law’s central problem.”). 
 20. See Romano, After the Revolution, supra note 3, at 356 
[P]olicy disputes are, at least in principle, resolvable empirically when 
there is consensus on ends, as there is among most U.S. corporate law 
scholars since the field was transformed with the application of finance 
and the theory of the firm (a consensus that the objective of public, for-
profit corporations is to maximize shareholder wealth). 
 21. See William W. Bratton, Enron and the Dark Side of Shareholder Value, 
76 TUL. L. REV. 1275, 1284 (2002) [hereinafter Bratton, Enron] (stating that 
shareholder value maximization has resulted in an obsession with “short-term 
performance numbers”); Vice Chancellor Leo E. Strine, Jr., Toward a True 
Corporate Republic: A Traditionalist Response to Bebchuk’s Solution for 
Improving Corporate America, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1759, 1764 (2006) [hereinafter 
Strine, Toward a True Corporate Republic] (discussing the increasing focus on 
quarter-to-quarter earnings); Lynn A. Stout, Why Carl Icahn Is Bad for Investors, 
WALL STREET J., Aug. 1, 2008, at A11 (stating that “activist” shareholders are 
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movements within a narrow time horizon.22 Such specific slices of 
time help to isolate the studied effects, but they may fail to catch 
longer-term trends that would undercut the initial findings.23 
Especially since the 2008 financial crisis, both academic research 
and the popular financial press have called the efficient capital 
markets hypothesis into question, particularly in the short-term.24 
The focus on finance more generally has been blamed for many of 
our long-term economic ills, particularly income inequality.25 
As for the second challenge, many have questioned the focus 
on share price as the sine qua non of empirical testing.26 
Stakeholder theory has long argued that the purpose of the 
corporation is not to maximize shareholder wealth, but rather to 
maximize the benefits provided to all those who participate in the 
life of the business, including employees, creditors, suppliers, 
consumers, and the community, along with shareholders.27 
Stakeholder theorists have not necessarily agreed on the 
                                                                                                     
usually short-termers). But see George W. Dent, Jr., The Essential Unity of 
Shareholders and the Myth of Investor Short-Termism, 35 DEL. J. CORP. L. 97, 
100–01 (2010) (arguing that shareholders do not have a problem with short-term 
focus). 
 22. See Fisch, supra note 4, at 642–44 (discussing the focus of event studies 
of share-price movements). 
 23. See id. at 661 (noting that “absent perfect market efficiency, short-term 
performance and value indicators, such as profitability and stock price, may not 
accurately reflect the long-term value of operational decisions”). 
 24.  See Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2398, 2421 
(2014) (“This view of market efficiency has since lost its luster.”); Donald 
Langevoort, Basic at Twenty: Rethinking Fraud on the Market, 2009 WIS. L. REV. 
151, 175 (2009) (“Doubts about the strength and pervasiveness of market 
efficiency are much greater today than they were in the mid–1980s.”); Baruch Lev 
& Meiring de Villiers, Stock Price Crashes and 10b-5 Damages: A Legal, 
Economic, and Policy Analysis, 47 STAN. L. REV. 7, 20 (1994) (“Not surprisingly, 
overwhelming empirical evidence suggests that capital markets are not 
fundamentally efficient.”). See generally JUSTIN FOX, THE MYTH OF THE RATIONAL 
MARKET: A HISTORY OF RISK, REWARD, AND DELUSION ON WALL STREET 28 (2011). 
 25. For critiques of overreliance on finance within the economy, see RANA 
FOROOHAR, MAKERS & TAKERS: THE RISE OF FINANCE AND THE FALL OF AMERICAN 
BUSINESS (2016); LAWRENCE E. MITCHELL, THE SPECULATION ECONOMY: HOW 
FINANCE TRIUMPHED OVER INDUSTRY (2008).  
 26. See Roberto Romano, The Political Economy of Takeover Statutes, 73 VA. 
L. REV. 111, 113 (1987) (stating that “the core goal of corporation law” is “the 
maximization of equity share prices”). 
 27. See STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, THE NEW CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN 
THEORY AND PRACTICE 9–10 (2008) (discussing stakeholder theory). 
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appropriate methods for calculating the appropriate normative 
target, if such a target were even ascertainable.28 But share prices 
themselves are arguably insufficient to bear the full weight of the 
enterprise.29 Even scholars who participate in the ongoing 
theoretical and empirical literature have expressed concern that 
corporate law scholarship has become too narrowly focused on 
event studies that track changes in stock prices.30 By balancing the 
entire discipline largely on a specific kind of study, measuring a 
specific kind of data, the current corporate law literature is ripe for 
a countermovement designed to present a fuller picture. 
The problem, at present, is that the countermovement lacks a 
normative foundation of its own upon which to build its critique. 
Progressive corporate law—construed broadly—has drawn upon a 
variety of sources in its research, such as doctrinal analysis, 
history, basic law and economics, sociological research, and 
philosophical precepts. Ultimately, however, there has been no 
sustained and meaningful exploration of an alternative 
methodology by a group of scholars working in the area.31 
I have argued in the past that scholars looking for a response 
to the dominant law and economics narrative need not forego 
economics to develop an alternative approach.32 The literature on 
the theory of the firm endeavors to answer the same question that 
lies at the heart of corporate law: why do we have firms in the first 
                                                                                                     
 28. See generally MITCHELL, supra note 25. 
 29. See Fisch, supra note 4, at 638 (“[T]he measures of shareholder value 
typically employed by empirical scholars—particularly short-term stock price—
are problematic as indicators of firm value and may reinforce inappropriate 
managerial decisions.”). 
 30. See id. (“[E]mpirical scholars need to offer better and explicit 
justifications for their reliance on shareholder wealth and, more importantly, for 
their argument that shareholder wealth effects should dominate regulatory 
policy.”). For an example of Fisch’s own empirical scholarship, see Stephen J. Choi 
et. al., Does Majority Voting Improve Board Accountability?, 83 U. CHI. L. REV. 
1119 (2016). 
 31. See Bainbridge, supra note 7, at 874 (“Although Progressive Corporate 
Law’s authors are united in their rejection of the contractarian model and of the 
Economic Man model, they achieve less unity in offering an alternative theory of 
the firm.”). 
 32. See Matthew T. Bodie, The Post-Revolutionary Period in Corporate Law: 
Returning to the Theory of the Firm, 35 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1033, 1044 (2012) (“The 
economic literature on the theory of the firm should be attractive to scholars 
looking to push into new frontiers in corporate law because it has the imprimatur 
of the current corporate law establishment, and yet is relatively underexplored.”). 
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place?33 In mainstream corporate law and economics, this is a 
settled question: the corporation exists to maximize shareholder 
wealth.34 But this is a deeply unsettling answer from an economic 
perspective, as it does not explain why the corporate form needs to 
exist outside of the market.35 Along these same lines, mainstream 
law and economics relies primarily on the “nexus of contract” 
theory to provide the structural basis for their theories.36 However, 
the nexus of contract theory endeavors to understand relationships 
within existing firms; it is not itself a theory of the firm.37 As Oliver 
Hart has argued: “the nexus of contracts approach does less to 
resolve the questions of what a firm is than to shift the terms of 
the debate.”38  
                                                                                                     
 33. See Oliver Hart, An Economist’s Perspective on the Theory of the Firm, 
89 COLUM. L. REV. 1757, 1757–65 (1989) (discussing various theories of the firm).  
 34. William Bratton, however, recently arrived at the following alternative 
description of corporate law purpose: 
We set out to frame an accurate and uncontroversial statement of 
purpose for corporate law. Here is the result: corporate law should 
facilitate corporate attempts to maximize productive output (and hence 
wealth) in a competitive economy, encouraging long-term investment 
at the lowest cost of capital, subject to exterior regulations that control 
externalities. Many would expect a tighter focus on maximization, but 
feasibility constraints preclude it. A more specific shareholder value 
objective would be both descriptively inaccurate and controversial. 
Finally, social welfare enhancement, while desirable, lies outside the 
limited sphere occupied by corporate law. 
William W. Bratton, Framing a Purpose for Corporate Law, 39 J. CORP. L. 713, 
723–24 (2014). 
35. Cf. LARRY E. RIBSTEIN, THE RISE OF THE UNCORPORATION 79–84 (2010) 
(attributing the corporation’s success as an organizational form to its limited 
liability for shareholders); Hart, supra note 33, at 1764 (discussing the 
weaknesses of corporate theory as a theory of the firm).  
 36. See FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC 
STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW 8–12 (1991) (describing nexus of contracts theory 
as “a shorthand for the complex arrangements of many sorts that those who 
associate voluntarily in the corporation will work out among themselves”). 
 37. See Thomas McInerney, Implications of High Performance Production 
and Work Practices for Theory of the Firm and Corporate Governance, 2004 
COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 135, 137–38 (2004) (“Scholars working in this paradigm do 
not offer theories of the firm so much as theories of who controls the firm.”); 
Edward B. Rock & Michael L. Wachter, Islands of Conscious Power: Law, Norms, 
and the Self-Governing Corporation, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1619, 1624–25 (2001) 
(“Jensen and Meckling, despite the title, did not really offer a full-fledged theory 
of the firm. Rather, they offered a theory of agency costs within firms . . . .”).  
 38. Hart, supra note 33, at 1764.  
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The theory of the firm literature, on the other hand, offers a 
deep and expanding pool of research upon which to draw in seeking 
to understand the “why” of firms. Progressive corporate law 
scholars are not content with the status quo; they seek to upend 
the settled doctrines of shareholder primacy and nexus of contract 
theory to provide to a more ecumenical, egalitarian corporate 
structure.39 Too often, however, progressive scholars have ceded 
the realm of economics for less defined, and arguably less rigorous, 
approaches.40 The theory of the firm offers a sustained 
interdisciplinary inquiry into the nature of firms (and their legal 
instantiations).41 Of course, much of the current work in other 
social sciences, such as psychology and sociology, dovetails with 
economic theory and provides additional insights into the basic 
economic models.42 The theory of the firm offers a starting point for 
                                                                                                     
 39. See Peter C. Kostant, Team Production and the Progressive Corporate 
Law Agenda, 35 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 667, 674–75 (2002) 
There is no uniformity among progressives but we share a concern that 
corporate law should treat public corporations as at least quasi-public 
institutions that must be viewed holistically as more than the sum of 
their privately ordered constituencies. Progressives are also concerned 
with the interests of corporate constituencies who cannot adequately 
protect themselves by contract. Progressive legal scholars tend to 
consider norms of behavior, especially as they involve fairness and 
social responsibility, and how such norms interact with legal rules. In 
doing this, our work increasingly utilizes insights from the behavioral 
sciences. 
 40. See Bainbridge, supra note 7, at 859 
Progressive Corporate Law's contributing authors, if pressed hard 
enough, would most likely not deny the relevance of economic 
principles to the study of corporate law. To the contrary, many of them 
make explicit use of selected economic tools. It is thus not economics 
per se to which they object, but rather to the specific economic models 
of firms and human behavior embraced by the law and economics 
school of corporate law and, sub silentio, to the unwillingness of those 
in the mainstream of law and economics to acknowledge those writing 
outside the prevailing paradigm. 
 41. See ERIC W. ORTS, BUSINESS PERSONS: A LEGAL THEORY OF THE FIRM 
(2013) (describing the legal theories of firms as foundational to understanding 
how firms are formed, for what purposes, and how firms function as 
organizational “persons”); Scott E. Masten, A Legal Basis for the Firm, 4 J.L. 
ECON. & ORG. 181 (1988) (exploring the firm as a distinct legal and organizational 
form). 
 42. See Bodie, supra note 32, at 1057 (noting that “the different social science 
disciplines—economics, psychology, sociology, anthropology—are increasingly 
borrowing from one another and bleeding into each other’s work”); see also THE 
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these inquiries and a basis upon which to build an alternative 
academic narrative. 
III. Employees, Not Stakeholders 
In contrast to shareholder primacy—a term first coined by 
David Millon and Lyman Johnson—progressive corporate law 
theorists have generally advocated for a stakeholder model of the 
corporation.43 Also called the communitarian or multifiduciary 
model,44 stakeholder theory argues that corporate governance 
should take all stakeholders in the corporate enterprise into 
account.45 In a sense, it draws upon the nexus of contract theory in 
identifying the many participants who have a role in conducting 
the business of the corporation. However, unlike the law and 
economics contractarians who limit organizational protections to 
shareholders, stakeholder advocates argue that all participants 
deserve consideration.46 Stakeholder reforms have generally 
centered around weakening shareholder power within the 
organizational structure and increasing managerial discretion to 
take other interests into account.47 
                                                                                                     
FIRM AS A COLLABORATIVE COMMUNITY: RECONSTRUCTING TRUST IN THE 
KNOWLEDGE ECONOMY (Charles Heckscher & Paul S. Adler eds., 2006) (taking an 
organizational behavior approach to the question of the firm). 
 43. See Lyman Johnson & David Millon, Missing the Point About State 
Takeover Statutes, 87 MICH. L. REV. 846, 848 (1989) (discussing a “deliberate 
rejection of the shareholder primacy norm”). 
 44. See Simone M. Sepe, Directors’ Duty to Creditors and the Debt Contract, 
1 J. BUS. & TECH. L. 553, 561 (2007) (noting that “communitarians . . . advocate a 
multifiduciary model where all corporate stakeholders benefit from the 
attribution of directors’ fiduciary duties”); see also Millon, Foundations, supra 
note 5, at 11–12 (discussing the use of the multifiduciary model by communitarian 
corporate law scholars). 
 45. See Millon, Foundations, supra note 5, at 11–12 (discussing efforts to 
provide protections to nonshareholder constituencies); Margaret M. Blair & Lynn 
A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law, 85 VA. L. REV. 247, 293–
94 (1999) (arguing that directors owe a duty to the corporation and that the 
corporation consists of all of the stakeholders who are responsible for the business 
of the enterprise). 
 46. See Millon, Foundations, supra note 5, at 11 (noting especially those 
whose interests may be negatively affected by the pursuit of shareholder interests 
and welfare). 
 47. See id. (rejecting the principles underlying shareholder primacy); Blair 
& Stout, supra note 45, at 280–81 (describing directors as “trustees for the 
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Progressive corporate law needs to move away from 
stakeholder theory. First, the antagonism towards shareholders 
has blinded stakeholder theorists to the need to reinforce 
shareholder power against managerial corruption.48 The story of 
the shareholder rights movement, going back to Berle and Means, 
is one that should resonate with progressives: it is the story of an 
undifferentiated mass of powerless shareholders separated from 
meaningful control, and the managers that then take advantage of 
this vacuum.49 As one example, progressives might very well 
applaud efforts by the Securities and Exchange Commission to 
allow easier shareholder proxy access as a way to prevent boards 
and officers from assuming unlimited power.50 Shareholder 
participation through Rule 14a-851 proposals provides a way for 
injecting environmental, moral, or political issues into the internal 
corporate realm.52 Interestingly, the traditional law and economics 
academy has fractured over shareholder empowerment, with 
shareholder advocates such as Lucian Bebchuk and Jesse Fried 
advocating against inflated CEO compensation,53 while traditional 
                                                                                                     
corporation itself—mediating hierarchs whose job is to balance team members’ 
competing interests in a fashion that keeps everyone happy enough that the 
productive coalition stays together”). 
 48. See Smith, supra note 1, at 281 n.11 (“In most situations, shareholder 
and nonshareholder constituency interests coincide . . . despite the shareholder 
wealth maximization norm. . . . [D]irectors and officers often take nonshareholder 
constituency interests into account. This is not particularly surprising because no 
one . . . seriously expects managers to leave their ethical and moral concerns at 
home.”). 
 49. See ADOLF A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN 
CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY (1932) (discussing the internal organization 
of the corporation in modern society and, specifically, the separation of ownership 
from control of the modern corporation and its consequences). 
 50. See Grant M. Hayden & Matthew T. Bodie, The Bizarre Law and 
Economics of Business Roundtable v. SEC, 38 J. CORP. L. 101, 103–08 (2012) 
(discussing the history of SEC proxy-access efforts up through the former Rule 
14a-11). 
 51. Rule 14a-8, General Rules and Regulations, Securities Exchange Act of 
1934, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-18 (2016). 
 52. See H. Rodgin Cohen & Glen T. Schleyer, Shareholder vs. Director 
Control over Social Policy Matters: Conflicting Trends in Corporate Governance, 
26 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 81, 82 (2012) (noting the presence of 
“shareholder proposals on social issues, including environmental, political, 
non-discrimination, and health-related issues, as well as executive compensation 
practices”). 
 53. See, e.g., LUCIAN BEBCHUK & JESSE FRIED, PAY WITHOUT PERFORMANCE: 
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law and economics proponents such as Joseph Grundfest and 
Stephen Bainbridge argue against increased shareholder power, 
even as they stand by shareholder wealth maximization.54 In my 
view, there is a progressive side to these debates, and it is the one 
that the American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial 
Organizations (AFL-CIO) has supported.55 But the progressive 
corporate law movement has largely avoided these debates, or—
worse, in my view—sided with management. 56 
But secondly, and more importantly for our purposes, 
stakeholder theory does not provide a stable foundation for a 
theory of corporate governance. As an oppositional theory, 
stakeholder theory has largely served to act as a rhetorical brake 
on some of the excesses of shareholder primacy.57 When confronted 
                                                                                                     
THE UNFULFILLED PROMISE OF EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION (2004) (illuminating 
structural flaws in corporate governance that produce widespread distortions in 
executive pay). 
 54. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Case for Limited Shareholder Voting 
Rights, 53 UCLA L. REV. 601, 603 (2006) (“Such efforts to extend 
the shareholder franchise are fundamentally misguided.”); Joseph A. Grundfest, 
The SEC’s Proposed Proxy Access Rules: Politics, Economics, and the Law, 65 BUS. 
LAW. 361, 380 (2010) (contending that increased shareholder power can “impair 
shareholder value”). 
 55. See Marleen A. O’Connor, Organized Labor as Shareholder Activist: 
Building Coalitions to Promote Worker Capitalism, 31 U. RICH. L. REV. 1345, 1350 
(1997) (“Labor-shareholder activism has significant symbolic value because it 
highlights the fact that working people are the beneficiaries of many 
institutional shareholders.”); Stewart J. Schwab & Randall S. Thomas, 
Realigning Corporate Governance: Shareholder Activism by Labor Unions, 96 
MICH. L. REV. 1018, 1019–20 (1998) (finding that “labor activism is a model for 
any large institutional investor attempting to maximize return on capital”); 
Damon Silvers, Commentary on “Toward Common Sense and Common Ground? 
Reflections on the Shared Interests of Managers and Labor in A More Rational 
System of Corporate Governance” by Leo E. Strine, Jr., 33 J. CORP. L. 85, 87 (2007) 
(“The AFL-CIO has been engaged in a number of efforts over the last five years 
to build bridges between long-term investors and the CEO community around the 
theory that there should be a shared commitment to the long-term health of 
enterprises.”). 
 56. See Christopher Bruner, Center-Left Politics and Corporate Governance: 
What Is the 'Progressive' Agenda? (SSRN Working Paper, February 15, 
2017), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2917253 (discussing the seemingly paradoxical 
approaches taken by different progressive groups as to various corporate 
governance matters). 
 57. For a discussion of those excesses, see Bratton, Enron, supra note 21; 
Matthew T. Bodie, AOL Time Warner and the False God of Shareholder Primacy, 
31 J. CORP. L. 975 (2006). 
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with the task of providing an alternative structure, stakeholder 
theory has served up relatively weak sauce.58 Under stakeholder 
theory, corporate governance structure looks pretty much the same 
as it does now.59 If anything, stakeholder theory expands upon the 
discretion provided to the board—and the management selected by 
the board—to follow their own judgment in contravention to the 
will of the shareholders.60 The most important tangible 
contribution of stakeholder theory to corporate law is the 
constituency statute, which is the law in a majority of states (but 
not Delaware).61 The constituency statute provides directors with 
the discretion to take the interests of all stakeholders into account 
when making certain types of decisions.62 Directors need not take 
other interests into account, and there is generally no remedy for 
other stakeholders.63 These statutes are just a way of insulating 
directors from claims that they failed to do enough for shareholders 
when contemplating a tender offer, merger, or factory shutdown.64 
The real problem with stakeholder theory is that it is not, at 
least at present, a real theory of firm governance. As the theory of 
the firm teaches, governance is necessary when enforceable 
contract terms are insufficient to protect the interests of the 
                                                                                                     
 58. See Millon, Communitarians, supra note 6, at 1387 (“Those who say that 
[progressive scholars] have not yet articulated a fully developed alternative 
agenda are correct.”). 
 59. See Grant Hayden & Matthew T. Bodie, Shareholder Democracy and the 
Curious Turn Toward Board Primacy, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2071, 2091–92 
(2010) [hereinafter Hayden & Bodie, Shareholder Democracy] (discussing the 
Blair and Stout “mediating hierarch” approach).  
 60. See id. (discussing how the “mediating hierarch” board is insulated in 
order to serve all stakeholders). 
 61. See Roberta Romano, The States as a Laboratory: Legal Innovation and 
State Competition for Corporate Charters, 23 YALE J. ON REG. 209, 215 tbl.1 (2006) 
(finding that thirty-one states have constituency statutes). 
 62. Some are limited to takeover/mergers, while others apply to all decisions. 
See Millon, Foundations, supra note 5, at 11–12 (“[Constituency] statutes take 
varying forms, but they share a common agenda. Each declares that the board of 
directors, in the course of making corporate decisions, may . . . consider various 
enumerated nonshareholder interests.”). 
 63. See id. at 13 (“To the extent that management must compromise its 
commitment to shareholder interests for the sake of nonshareholders, 
shareholders stand to lose.”). 
 64. See id. at 13–14 (describing the difficulties faced by corporate 
management when they are accountable to multiple constituencies despite their 
potentially “conflicting interest”). 
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parties involved.65 Firms develop as “islands of conscious power” 
within the market because they manage issues that could not 
otherwise be handled by the market.66 Although the participants 
are in fact in contractual relationships, these relationships are 
sufficiently incomplete so as to suffer serious enforcement flaws.67 
As a result, a firm structure is necessary to structure the contracts 
and provide a mechanism for resolving disputes within the firm.68 
Even though the nexus of contract theory would seem to be 
antithetical to the theory of the firm, it does in fact provide a 
rationale for firms and for shareholder primacy. As developed at 
length in Easterbrook and Fischel’s The Economic Structure of 
Corporate Law, the theory provides: shareholders suffer serious 
contractual vulnerability at the hands of firm management, who 
have complete discretion over the returns allocated to 
shareholders.69 Shareholders are given voting rights to protect 
themselves against opportunism by firm management.70 The other 
firm participants can more easily protect themselves through 
contract.71 But because shareholders hold rights to the residual, 
they are the best locus of voting power to incentivize the firm to 
maximize utility for all participants.72 
                                                                                                     
 65. See Oliver E. Williamson, Why Law, Economics, and Organization?, 1 
ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 369, 373 (2005) (“Governance problems are posed when 
incomplete contracts (to include unforeseen contingencies) are combined with 
opportunism.”). 
 66. Ronald H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386, 388 (1937) 
(quoting D.H. ROBERTSON, THE CONTROL OF INDUSTRY 85 (1930)). 
 67. See Rock & Wachter, supra note 37, at 1621 (contending that legal 
governance relations are insufficient to manage the economic firm on their own). 
 68. See Bengt Holmstrom, The Firm as a Subeconomy, 15 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 
74, 80 (1999) (“When contracts are incomplete in the sense that they cannot 
incorporate all future contracting opportunities, governance becomes 
consequential.”). 
 69. See generally EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 36, at 68–69. 
 70. See Rock & Wachter, supra note 37, at 1699 (describing one method for 
“mitigating the potential for opportunism” that can be “accomplished by assigning 
voting rights to shareholders”). 
 71. See Fisch, supra note 4, at 659 (“[T]he scope of protection afforded to 
stakeholder interests depends on the quality of contractual protection.”). 
 72. See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 36, at 68 (“As the residual 
claimants, shareholders have the appropriate incentives . . . to make 
discretionary decisions . . . .”). 
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Stakeholder theory, on the other hand, lacks a model for 
allocating governance rights and responsibilities among the 
participants.73 It could be argued that stakeholder theory is more 
in tune with the nexus of contracts approach, since it treats all the 
participants in the firm as deserving of governance consideration.74 
However, it fails to develop a system for managing the different 
stakeholders within the firm.75 Stakeholder theory does not, for 
example, argue that corporations are simply contractual nexuses 
and, thus, should not exist as legal entities.76 Nor, more 
surprisingly, have stakeholder theorists sketched out a system 
whereby all stakeholders can participate in firm governance. 
Instead, stakeholder theorists have largely glommed on to the 
existing structure of corporate law, whereby shareholders elect 
directors who appoint officers.77 The only real difference is that 
                                                                                                     
 73. See Joseph Heath, Business Ethics Without Stakeholders, 16 BUS. ETHICS 
Q. 533, 543 (2006) (arguing that stakeholder theory creates “extraordinary agency 
risks” because of the potential for conflicts); Eric W. Orts & Alan Strudler, Putting 
a Stake in Stakeholder Theory, 88 J. BUS. ETHICS 605, 611 (2009) (arguing that 
stakeholder theory fails to provide a system of mechanisms for governance, other 
than “balancing” stakeholder concerns). 
 74. See Martin Gelter, Taming or Protecting the Modern Corporation? 
Shareholder-Stakeholder Debates in a Modern Comparative Light, 7 N.Y.U. J.L. 
& BUS. 641, 666 (2011) (“[S]takeholder theories based on the idea of specific 
investment of other corporate constituencies . . . [assume] that regular contracts 
do not provide complete protection for these groups, but are still firmly grounded 
within the nexus [of contracts] framework.”). 
 75. See Orts & Strudler, supra note 73, at 609 (claiming that the vagueness 
of stakeholder theory “is pernicious because it tells us to balance stakeholder 
interests, but does not say anything about how to determine who (or what) counts 
as a stakeholder . . . or how to determine when an appropriate balancing has 
occurred”). 
 76. Instead, many stakeholder theorists also ascribe to the entity view of the 
corporation, which argues for treating the corporation as a state-created separate 
entity. See Martin Petrin, Reconceptualizing the Theory of the Firm—From 
Nature to Function, 118 PENN. ST. L. REV. 1, 24 (2013) 
CSR scholars and stakeholder theorists have justified consideration of 
broader stakeholder interests by characterizing the firm as not merely 
a legal fiction but rather as a moral organism with social and ethical 
responsibilities, or built upon the view of the corporation as an entity 
existing in time and as a distinct person. 
 77. See Hayden & Bodie, Shareholder Democracy, supra note 59, at 2113 
(discussing examples). 
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under stakeholder theory, directors have more discretion to act in 
the interests of all stakeholders.78 
It might be possible for stakeholder theory to develop a new 
system of corporate governance whereby all stakeholders have 
direct ways to participate in firm governance. But such theorists 
would have to do the difficult work of assigning rights to all 
participants in a meaningful way—beyond the contractual 
protections they already hold. The whole point of firm governance 
is to move beyond contract.79 Yet stakeholder theory seems content 
with the current power structure, as long as directors do not get 
too beholden to their electorate. This approach is not internally 
coherent. As Grant Hayden and I have argued in an earlier article, 
it makes little sense to attack shareholder primacy but then 
maintain the exclusive shareholder franchise.80 Stakeholder 
theory has failed to present a viable alternative to the status 
quo/shareholder primacy model; at best, it advocates for a 
watered-down version of shareholder primacy. 
Progressive corporate law needs a new model. Instead of 
treating all stakeholders equally, progressives should focus on two 
types of stakeholders: shareholders and employees. These are the 
stakeholders who are invested in the firm in such a way that they 
need firm governance to protect against opportunism. As 
contractarians have recognized, shareholders are in fact situated 
differently from other stakeholders, particularly other capital 
providers, when it comes to their contractual vulnerability.81 They 
have invested their money into the firm with no ability to withdraw 
                                                                                                     
 78. See id. 
 79. See Coase, supra note 66, at 391–93 (discussing why production is 
organized through firms, rather than markets). 
 80. See Hayden & Bodie, Shareholder Democracy, supra note 59, at 2113 
(discussing the “strange turn” from stakeholder theory to the exclusive 
shareholder franchise). Stakeholder theorists have acknowledged this difficulty. 
See Blair & Stout, supra note 45, at 312 (“Recognizing that shareholder voting 
rights can act as a safety net to protect against extreme misconduct poses 
something of a problem for the mediating hierarchy approach, as it suggests that 
shareholders enjoy more control over how the firm is run than do other members 
of the coalition.”). 
 81.  See, e.g., EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 36, at 68–69; Benjamin 
Means, A Contractual Approach to Shareholder Oppression Law, 79 FORDHAM L. 
REV. 1161, 1197 (2010) (discussing the problem of “shareholder oppression” and 
vulnerability, and the inability of contracts to unequivocally protect such 
shareholders). 
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it and subject to uncertain payoffs, largely at the discretion of 
management.82 However, employees are also firm investors. They 
have invested their labor, reputations, and firm-specific individual 
capital in the firm and cannot not pull these investments out.83 By 
law and by norms, they are compensated on a more regular basis, 
and with less discretion, than shareholders.84 However, they are 
still significantly more attached to the firm, and within the 
auspices of the firm, than the other stakeholders.85 
Moreover, the theory of the firm provides support for a 
governance model that includes employees. Theory of the firm 
scholars have long appreciated the importance of the employee to 
our conception of the firm.86 In fact, Ronald Coase looked to the 
relationship between employer and employee to demonstrate 
                                                                                                     
 82. See Margaret M. Blair, Locking in Capital: What Corporate Law 
Achieved for Business Organizers in the Nineteenth Century, 51 UCLA L. REV. 
387, 392 (2003) (citing the importance of “resource commitment” or capital lock-in 
as a critical reason for the success of the corporation as a private enterprise). 
 83. See Kent Greenfield, The Place of Workers in Corporate Law, 39 B.C. L. 
REV. 283, 302 (1998) (noting that firm-specific skills “make a worker more 
valuable to her present employer, but also make her more vulnerable to a firm’s 
opportunistic behavior”); Andrew Keay, Stakeholder Theory in Corporate Law: 
Has It Got What It Takes?, 9 RICH. J. GLOBAL L. & BUS. 249, 368 (2010) (“For 
instance, employees may make an investment in corporations by way of 
undergoing specialised training that might not be able to be used elsewhere in 
other employment.”). 
 84. As late as the nineteenth century, employees worked for terms as long 
as a year and were not entitled to any contractual payment if they left before the 
end. See, e.g., Stark v. Parker, 19 Mass. 267, 292–94 (1824) (denying any 
contractual recovery for an employee who left after nine months of a 
twelve-month job); Britton v. Turner, 6 N.H. 481, 491–92 (1834) (denying 
contractual recovery but allowing for recovery under restitution). Now, however, 
wage and hour laws require payment for time worked and periodic payments 
made to the employee. See generally The Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, Pub. 
L. No. 75-718, 52 Stat. 1060 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (2012)). 
 85. There may be certain exceptions in unusual situations. See HENRY 
HANSMANN, THE OWNERSHIP OF ENTERPRISE 149–223 (1996) (discussing specific 
instances of customer-owned enterprises); David G. Yosifon, The Consumer 
Interest in Corporate Law, 43 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 253 (2009) [hereinafter Yosifon, 
Consumer Interest] (arguing that consumers are inadequately represented in 
corporate governance); David G. Yosifon, Consumer Lock-in and the Theory of the 
Firm, 35 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1429, 1430 (2012) [hereinafter Yosifon, Lock-in] 
(concluding that “a departure from the shareholder wealth maximization norm 
and an embrace of a multi-stakeholder corporate governance regime may be 
necessary to overcome agency problems associated with consumer lock-in”). 
 86. See generally Coase, supra note 66, at 401–05. 
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empirical support for his theory of the firm.87 Armen Alchian and 
Harold Demsetz argued that the importance of the firm (as 
separate from the market) stems from the need to coordinate 
production from a variety of inputs.88 They defined team 
production as “production in which 1) several types of resources 
are used and 2) the product is not a sum of separable outputs of 
each cooperating resource.”89 Team production is used—and firms 
replace markets—when the coordinated effort increases 
productivity, after factoring out the costs associated with 
monitoring and disciplining the team.90 Margaret Blair and Lynn 
Stout relied on this notion of team production in developing their 
stakeholder-based theory.91 But the non-separable inputs within 
team production really belong to employees and shareholders.92 
Shareholders provide capital that is taken within the firm and 
turned into discretionary funds.93 Employees work together under 
the aegis of the firm to produce goods or services in a manner that 
generally cannot be separated out to assign specific values.94 All 
other participants do not really engage in the team production 
process, and, thus, do not need to work within the firm.95 Creditors 
provide money on fixed terms.96 Suppliers and independent 
                                                                                                     
 87. See id. at 403 (“We can best approach the question of what constitutes a 
firm in practice by considering the legal relationship normally called that of 
‘master and servant’ or ‘employer and employee.’”). 
 88. See Armen A. Alchian & Harold Demsetz, Production, Information Costs, 
and Economic Organization, 62 AM. ECON. REV. 777, 778 (1972) (describing the 
firm as a “centralized contractual agent in a team production process”). 
 89. Id. at 779. 
 90. Id. at 780. 
 91. See Blair & Stout, supra note 45, at 275 (analyzing the “team production 
problem” arising “when a number of individuals must invest firm-specific 
resources to produce a nonseparable output”). 
 92. See id. at 249 (“If the team members’ investments are 
firm-specific . . . and if output from the enterprise is nonseparable, . . . serious 
problems can arise in determining how any economic surpluses generated by 
team production . . . should be divided.”). 
 93. See id. at 277 (“Providers of financial capital—shareholders and even, 
potentially, some creditors—are, by this agreement, just as ‘stuck’ in the firm as 
are providers of specialized human capital.”). 
 94. Id. at 261. 
 95. See id. at 269 (arguing that “employees, shareholders, and executives” 
are the main players on the corporate “team”). 
 96. But cf. Alan J. Meese, The Team Production Theory of Corporate Law: A 
Critical Assessment, 43 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1629, 1652–55 (2002) (arguing that 
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contractors provide specific services outside of the firm’s scope. 
Consumers purchase the goods or services after the production 
process is complete.97 And the surrounding community regulates 
the firm as it does all other individuals and organizations within 
its jurisdiction. Yes, it is fair to say that all of these participants 
are engaged in the production process. But then all participants in 
the market are engaged in commerce with one another. It is only 
when we have a team production process—when the parties cannot 
effectively use the market—that we need to create a firm and 
facilitate the process of team production.98 Employees and 
shareholders are part of that team production process in a way that 
stakeholders outside the firm are not. 
There has been some recognition within progressive corporate 
law that employees may be different than other stakeholders. Kent 
Greenfield has long advocated for a special role for employees in 
corporate law, including the possibility of board representation.99 
Brett McDonnell has studied and advocated for various forms of 
worker participation in governance, including employee 
ownership.100 Marleen O’Connor’s work has largely focused on 
protecting employees through fiduciary duties and statutory 
rights.101 However, most communitarian and/or stakeholder 
theorists desire to encompass a complete and variegated 
                                                                                                     
“[t]here is no doubt that creditors who loan money to publicly held corporations 
thereby make a team-specific investment” but that they are “less vulnerable to 
opportunism when trading with publicly held corporations” when compared to 
other team members). 
 97. See Yosifon, Consumer Interest, supra note 85, at 259 (discussing the 
cabined role of some consumers in the transacting process). 
 98. See id. at 265 (“If the activities and inputs of those participants are 
adequately coordinated, their collective output can be qualitatively different and 
vastly larger than the sum of what each individual could produce separately.”). 
 99. See generally KENT GREENFIELD, THE FAILURE OF CORPORATE LAW: 
FUNDAMENTAL FLAWS AND PROGRESSIVE POSSIBILITIES 112 (2006).  
 100. See Brett H. McDonnell, Strategies for an Employee Role in Corporate 
Governance, 46 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 429, 430–31 (2011) (evaluating “a number 
of possible strategies for creating a role for employees in corporate governance”); 
see also Brett H. McDonnell, Employee Primacy, or Economics Meets Civic 
Republicanism at Work, 13 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 334, 334 (2008) (promoting 
employee primacy). 
 101. See generally Marleen A. O’Connor, Restructuring the Corporation’s 
Nexus of Contracts: Recognizing A Fiduciary Duty to Protect Displaced Workers, 
69 N.C. L. REV. 1189 (1991); Marleen O’Connor, Labor’s Role in the American 
Corporate Governance Structure, 22 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 97 (2000). 
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assemblage of stakeholders.102 To provide one (topical) example, 
David Millon has acknowledged that “[t]he most compelling 
theoretical arguments for nonshareholder protection have focused 
on employees,” and that “the relative inadequacy of bargaining 
power and other disadvantages may more seriously impede 
bargained-for protection for employees than for other 
nonshareholder groups.”103 However, he ultimately has rejected a 
shareholder-employee model on the grounds that “the idea of the 
corporation as a community would not justify a model that 
disregarded the interests of other nonshareholder groups.”104 
Other stakeholder theorists have agreed.105 
Concern for the fates of other stakeholders is understandable 
and may, in some circumstances, warrant a species of governance 
protection.106 Creditors, for example, may receive specific 
protections when the company is close to bankruptcy as a way of 
mitigating their particular vulnerabilities in such situations.107 
                                                                                                     
 102. See, e.g., Keay, supra note 83, at 255–56 (“A stakeholder approach . . . is 
premised on the notion that an inclusive approach towards all contributors is—
from a social, economic and political perspective—valuable.”). 
 103. Millon, Foundations, supra note 5, at 19.  
 104. Id. at 14. 
 105. See, e.g., Blair & Stout, supra note 45, at 255 
Because this view challenges the shareholder primacy norm that has 
come to dominate the theoretical literature, our analysis appears to 
parallel many of the arguments raised in recent years by the 
“communitarian” or “progressive” school of corporate scholars who 
believe that corporate law ought to require directors to serve not only 
the shareholders’ interests, but also those of employees, consumers, 
creditors, and other corporate “stakeholders.” 
 106. See id. at 275 (“[T]he public corporation is not so much a ‘nexus of 
contracts’ (explicit or implicit) as a ‘nexus of firm-specific investments,’ in which 
several different groups contribute unique and essential resources to 
the corporate enterprise, and who each find it difficult to protect their 
contribution through explicit contracts.”). 
 107. See, e.g., Robert P. Bartlett, III, Shareholder Wealth Maximization as 
Means to an End, 38 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 255, 296 (2015) (“[C]ourts should revert 
to their traditional focus on policing against the bargaining failures that can occur 
when investors use directors to address the incomplete contracting challenges 
that are replete in corporate finance.”); Frederick Tung, Leverage in the Board 
Room: The Unsung Influence of Private Lenders in Corporate Governance, 57 
UCLA L. REV. 115, 119 (2009) [hereinafter Tung, Leverage] (arguing that “bank 
creditors and other private lenders often enjoy significant oversight and influence 
over managerial decisions”). For a discussion of the possible expansion of 
fiduciary duties to creditors, see Frederick Tung, The New Death of Contract: 
Creeping Corporate Fiduciary Duties for Creditors, 57 EMORY L.J. 809, 814–15 
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Certain consumers may have the type of long-term, invested 
interests, such that some governance and/or ownership rights may 
make sense.108 In the main, however, regulation will be the most 
straightforward way of managing issues that arise and are not 
amenable to contractual resolution. Creditors have statutory 
rights within bankruptcy.109 Consumer protection laws can place 
mandatory terms or disclosure requirements on firms.110 
Environmental protections address externalities by imposing costs 
on firms (and individuals) for creating those externalities.111 But 
corporate governance, like all firm governance, should be 
addressed to solving problems that arise within the firm 
structure—problems related to team production.112 And employees 
                                                                                                     
(2008) [hereinafter Tung, Fiduciary Duties]. 
 108. See HANSMANN, supra note 85, at 149–68 (discussing consumer 
ownership); Yosifon, Lock-In, supra note 85, at 1449–59 (discussing types of lock-
in situations). 
 109.  See Tung, Fiduciary Duties, supra note 107, at 842 (“By the time the 
firm is in distress, its creditors will enjoy differing rights (including payment and 
priority rights), differing stakes in the continuation of the borrower firm, and 
differing contract protections.”). 
 110. Cf. Mark E. Budnitz, The Development of Consumer Protection Law, the 
Institutionalization of Consumerism, and Future Prospects and Perils, 26 GA. ST. 
U. L. REV. 1147, 1169 (2010) (“Despite the many state and federal statutes that 
have been enacted in the last forty years to regulate consumer transactions, the 
underlying contract between the company and the consumer remains crucial in 
determining the rights and liabilities of the parties.”). 
 111. I understand that stakeholder theorists may not want to assign 
responsibility for the environment purely to environmental regulations, since the 
fate of our planet is of utmost importance. See, e.g., Matthew T. Bodie, NASCAR 
Green: The Problem of Sustainability in Corporations and Corporate Law, 46 
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 491, 491 (2011) (“Slowing down and ultimately reversing 
global warming is the preeminent global challenge of our time.”). But corporate 
law concerns internal governance, not environmental regulation. For those 
businesses that want to bake environmental sustainability or other socially 
beneficial missions into their organizational DNA, most states are now providing 
the benefit corporation as a legal form for channeling such focus. See, e.g., Joan 
MacLeod Heminway, Corporate Purpose and Litigation Risk in Publicly Held U.S. 
Benefit Corporations, 40 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 611, 612 (2017) (defining benefit 
corporations as “corporations organized for the express purpose of realizing both 
financial wealth for shareholders and articulated social or environmental 
benefits”); Matthew J. Dulac, Note, Sustaining the Sustainable Corporation: 
Benefit Corporations and the Viability of Going Public, 104 GEO. L.J. 171, 173–79 
(2015) (providing a “primer” on benefit corporations and sustainability). 
 112. See Blair & Stout, supra note 45, at 250 (“[P]ublic corporation law can 
offer a second-best solution to team production problems because it allows 
rational individuals who hope to profit from team production to overcome shirking 
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and shareholders are the two primary groups that are engaged in 
the process of team production within the firm.113 
And the fate of employees should be of particular concern to 
progressives’ hearts. The late nineteenth century progressive 
movement sought to empower family farmers and industrial 
laborers against trusts, robber barons, company towns, corrupt 
governments, and other forms of entrenched power.114 We are faced 
today with a similar sense of alienation and powerlessness in the 
face of multinational corporations and global governments that 
seem, to many, radically disconnected from their daily lives.115 
Employees have no official voice in the corporate structure, and 
they often have little unofficial voice within the workplace.116 
Decisions are made through a hierarchical structure in which the 
employee plays no part.117 Labor unions, which had been the 
primary vehicle for worker engagement with their companies, now 
represent less than seven percent of the private workforce.118 
Employees have been separated from the corporations for which 
they work.119 
                                                                                                     
and rent-seeking by opting into an internal governance structure we call the 
‘mediating hierarchy.’”). 
 113. Note that an employee-equity governance structure for the firm would 
still align with William Bratton’s description of the corporate purpose: “corporate 
law should facilitate corporate attempts to maximize productive output (and 
hence wealth) in a competitive economy, encouraging long-term investment at the 
lowest cost of capital, subject to exterior regulations that control externalities.” 
Bratton, supra note 34, at 723–24. 
 114. See Brett W. King, The Use of Supermajority Voting Rules in Corporate 
America: Majority Rule, Corporate Legitimacy, and Minority Shareholder 
Protection, 21 DEL. J. CORP. L. 895, 911 (1996) (discussing “an age of robber 
barons, monopolies, trusts, and moguls” that led to the progressive movement). 
 115. See, e.g., Bernie Sanders, Where the Democrats Go from Here, N.Y. TIMES, 
Nov. 11, 2016, at A25 (“Over the last 30 years, too many Americans were sold out 
by their corporate bosses.”). 
 116. See McDonnell, supra note 100, at 429 (noting that “corporate law does 
nothing to encourage any role for employees in corporate governance”). 
 117. See id. at 433 (“[I]n large U.S. corporations . . . employees frequently 
have a suboptimal level of involvement in decision making.”). 
 118. See Economic News Release: Union Members Summary, BUREAU OF 
LABOR STATISTICS (Jan. 28, 2016, 10:00 AM), http://www.bls.gov/news.release/ 
union2.nr0.htm (last edited Jan. 26, 2017) (last visited Apr. 6, 2017) (“Public-
sector workers had a union membership rate (35.2 percent) more than five times 
higher than that of private-sector workers (6.7 percent).”) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 119. Dalia Tsuk has argued that this process happened as a result of several 
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But what actual role can employees play in corporate 
governance? The next Section begins to consider some possible 
approaches.  
IV. The Need for Structural Corporate Law Reform 
In the recent case of eBay Domestic Holdings, Inc. v. 
Newmark,120 former Delaware Chancellor Chandler dismayed 
many stakeholder theorists by reaffirming corporate law’s 
commitment to shareholder primacy.121 In discussing an action by 
the original founders of craigslist to adopt a shareholders’ rights 
plan, Chancellor Chandler stated:  
As an abstract matter, there is nothing inappropriate about an 
organization seeking to aid local, national, and global 
communities by providing a website for online classifieds that 
is largely devoid of monetized elements. . . . [The majority 
shareholders, however,] opted to form craigslist, Inc. as a 
for-profit Delaware corporation and voluntarily accepted 
millions of dollars from eBay as part of a transaction whereby 
eBay became a stockholder. Having chosen a for-profit 
corporate form, the craigslist directors are bound by the 
fiduciary duties and standards that accompany that form. 
                                                                                                     
forces, including academics: 
Focusing on major issues in corporate law—the nature of corporate 
entities and corporate power—this Article explores how, in the course 
of the twentieth century, legal scholars and political theorists helped 
remove the interests of workers (as differentiated from shareholders, 
officers, and directors) from the core concerns of corporate law and 
theory. It demonstrates how scholars’ conversations about corporate 
entities and corporate power were influenced by a shared cultural and 
intellectual objection to Marxist class analysis with its focus on the 
proletariat. It further explicates how the purging of the working class 
from scholarly imagination paved a way, first, for the rise of the new 
classes of managers and owners and the shareholder-centered vision of 
corporate law and, then, for the emergence of a narrow, 
shareholder-wealth-maximization norm, which is being questioned 
today. 
Dalia Tsuk, Corporations Without Labor: The Politics of Progressive Corporate 
Law, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 1861, 1864 (2003). 
 120. 16 A.3d 1 (Del. Ch. Ct. 2010). 
 121. See id. at 34 (refusing to “accept as valid . . . a corporate policy that 
specifically, clearly, and admittedly seeks not to maximize the economic value of 
a for-profit Delaware corporation for the benefit of its stockholders”). 
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Those standards include acting to promote the value of the 
corporation for the benefit of its stockholders. The “Inc.” after 
the company name has to mean at least that.122 
The eBay decision was disheartening for stakeholder theorists 
because of its express ratification of shareholder primacy. Up until 
eBay, stakeholder supporters could plausibly argue that Delaware 
law hovered somewhere between shareholder primacy and 
stakeholder theory.123 For every Revlon124 case requiring 
shareholder wealth maximization, there was a Time Warner v. 
Paramount125 allowing boards to take actions that would only favor 
shareholders indirectly, or over the long term.126 
Despite the result in eBay, stakeholder theorists have not 
given up the hope for doctrinal victories. Indeed, in Burwell v. 
Hobby Lobby, Inc.,127 the Supreme Court seemed to adopt, to some 
extent, a stakeholder theory of the corporation for purposes of 
determining its religious character.128 The Court’s willingness to 
depart from shareholder primacy arguably made the case a 
positive development for progressive corporate law.129 As Lyman 
                                                                                                     
 122. Id.  
 123. For a discussion of the yin and yang of corporate law theory, see 
Christopher M. Bruner, The Enduring Ambivalence of Corporate Law, 59 ALA. L. 
REV. 1385, 1386 (2008) (“[C]orporate law is, and will remain, deeply ambivalent—
both doctrinally and morally—with respect to each of three fundamental and 
related issues: the locus of ultimate corporate governance authority, the intended 
beneficiaries of corporate production, and the relationship between corporate law 
and the achievement of the social good.”). 
 124.  506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986). 
 125.  571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1990). 
 126. Compare Revlon, 506 A.2d at 182 (“O]btaining the highest price for the 
benefit of the stockholders should have been the central theme guiding director 
action.”), with Paramount Commc’ns, 571 A.2d at 1142 (“We also find that Time’s 
board did not by entering into its initial merger agreement with Warner come 
under a Revlon duty either to auction the company or to maximize short-term 
shareholder value, notwithstanding the unequal share exchange.”). 
 127. 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014). 
 128. See Brett H. McDonnell, The Liberal Case for Hobby Lobby, 57 ARIZ. L. 
REV. 777, 803 (2015) (finding that when the Court speaks of shareholders, officers, 
and employees as relevant corporate actors, “[t]his suggests more of a stakeholder 
conception of the corporation, not a shareholder conception”).  
 129. See id. at 822 (“The liberal and progressive agenda within corporate law 
is to create as much legal, practical, and ideological space as possible for 
corporations that pursue a variety of social values while still looking to make 
some money. Justice Alito’s opinion fits readily within that agenda.”). But see Leo 
E. Strine, Jr., A Job Is Not a Hobby: The Judicial Revival of Corporate 
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Johnson and David Millon have claimed, “[t]his judicial 
endorsement [in Hobby Lobby] likely will further legitimate 
corporate goals other than profit maximization.”130  
Ultimately, however, this is just palace intrigue. The power 
structures are already in place. As Delaware Supreme Court Chief 
Justice Leo Strine has put it, in his inimitable way: 
In current corporate law scholarship, there is a tendency among 
those who believe that corporations should be more socially 
responsible to avoid the more difficult and important task of 
advocating for externality regulation of corporations in a 
globalizing economy and encouraging institutional investors to 
exercise their power as stockholders responsibly. Instead, these 
advocates for corporate social responsibility pretend that 
directors do not have to make stockholder welfare the sole end 
of corporate governance, within the limits of their legal 
discretion, under the law of the most important American 
jurisdiction—Delaware.  
According to these commentators, if only corporate directors 
recognized that the stockholders are just one of many ends they 
can legally pursue, the world would be a better place. Corporate 
directors, under this rosy view, may consider any or all of the 
following to be ends as important, or even more important, than 
the economic well-being of the corporation’s stockholders: the 
employees, the customers of the corporation, the environment, 
charitable causes, the communities within which the 
corporation operates, and society generally. 
These well-meaning commentators, of course, ignore certain 
structural features of corporation law that folks like Madison 
and Hamilton would have thought important. The contention 
that [§ 101(b) of the Delaware General Corporation Law 
(“DGCL”)] proves directors are free to promote interests other 
than those of stockholders ignores the many ways in which the 
DGCL focuses corporate managers on stockholder welfare by 
allocating power only to a single constituency, the stockholders. 
                                                                                                     
Paternalism and Its Problematic Implications, 41 J. CORP. L. 71, 110 (2015) (“Put 
simply, these other constituencies appear to have been useful purely as an 
instrument to the majority’s justification for allowing corporate managers to use 
the corporate entity as a vehicle for the expression of their own religious beliefs, 
solely by virtue of having managerial control.”). 
 130. Lyman Johnson & David Millon, Corporate Law After Hobby Lobby, 70 
BUS. LAW. 1, 25 (2015); see also id. at 31 (“Here the United States Supreme Court 
speaks clearly to the fundamental issue of corporate purpose and states correctly 
that corporate law authorizes non-profit-maximizing behavior.”). 
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Under the DGCL, only stockholders have the right to vote for 
directors; approve certificate amendments; amend the bylaws; 
approve certain other transactions, such as mergers, and 
certain asset sales and leases; and enforce the DGCL’s terms 
and hold directors accountable for honoring their fiduciary 
duties. In the corporate republic, no constituency other than 
stockholders is given any power.131 
I understand the desire of progressives to influence the 
Delaware chancellors and justices and to ameliorate some of the 
harsh effects that a focus on short-term share price can bring. 
(Indeed, the Chief Justice understands this desire as well.132) And 
I do not mean to diminish the impact of either Delaware corporate 
law doctrine or its hortatory rhetoric in shaping behavior in 
boardrooms across America.133 However, fighting over the extent 
to which courts embrace the ideology of shareholder primacy 
should not be the only, or even the primary, grounds upon which 
the academic battles rage. Changes in the power structure are 
necessary to effectuate much of what a progressive corporate law 
would seek to accomplish.134 But there is no meaningful 
alternative. 
Thus, progressive corporate law must turn its attention to the 
kind of reforms that would bring about meaningful change. The 
progressive corporate law agenda must include changes to the 
                                                                                                     
 131. Honorable Leo E. Strine, Jr., The Dangers of Denial: The Need for a 
Clear-Eyed Understanding of the Power and Accountability Structure Established 
by the Delaware General Corporation Law, 50 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 761, 763–66 
(2015); see also Leo E. Strine, Jr., Our Continuing Struggle with the Idea That 
for-Profit Corporations Seek Profit, 47 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 135, 135–36 (2012) 
(“[T]he continued failure of our societies to be clear-eyed about the role of the 
for-profit corporation endangers the public interest.”). 
 132. Strine, Toward a True Corporate Republic, supra note 21, at 1769–70 
(arguing against a shareholder-primacy approach that in his view “put[s] too 
much power in the hands of institutional investors with short-term interests”). 
 133. See Edward B. Rock, Saints and Sinners: How Does Delaware Corporate 
Law Work?, 44 UCLA L. REV. 1009, 1015 (1997) (“Delaware courts fill out the 
concept of ‘good faith’ through fact-intensive, normatively saturated descriptions 
of manager, director, and lawyer conduct, and of process—descriptions that are 
not reducible to rules . . . .”).  
 134. Providing for employee participation in corporate governance would 
require changing state corporate law or superseding provisions of federal law. For 
an example of providing for such participation through a nonbinding employee 
vote on transformative transactions, see Matthew T. Bodie, Workers, Information, 
and Corporate Combinations: The Case for Nonbinding Employee Referenda in 
Transformative Transactions, 85 WASH. U. L. REV. 871 (2007). 
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statutory structure that would better accomplish the distribution 
of power within the firm.135 Such a task may not only seem 
impossible—it may seem outside the institutional competence of 
law professors, and it may seem extremely unlikely to occur. But 
otherwise, we are stuck arguing about the dicta used in the eBay 
and Hobby Lobby opinions.136 We should aim higher. 
At the same time, we should look to shape corporate behavior 
in ways beyond those traditional pillars of corporate law—voting 
rights and fiduciary duties. Corporations are already beginning to 
experiment in greater numbers with different forms of employee 
participation in internal firm governance.137 It may be that the real 
action is within the corporation’s internal governance structure, 
operating within the loose legal constraints that corporate law 
imposes.138 But corporate law may nevertheless still have a role to 
play in managing the boundaries of these internal structures and 
providing incentives to the firm to adopt employee-friendly 
policies. Federal employee benefits law has very successfully 
provided carrots and sticks to encourage companies to create and 
maintain appropriate employee pension and welfare benefits.139 A 
similar scheme could encourage companies to provide greater 
employee participation within the governance of a firm.  
                                                                                                     
 135. For purposes of this essay, I leave aside the question of whether the most 
efficient result is by definition the most just result. 
 136. As Johnson and Millon recognize, the Supreme Court’s Hobby Lobby 
opinion has no direct effect on state corporate law doctrine and has at most 
“persuasive force.” Johnson & Millon, supra note 130, at 24 (“[T]he Court’s views 
on corporate purpose would not be binding in the context of a state law dispute 
on the issue of permitted (or mandated) corporate purpose, if the state’s highest 
court had decided otherwise or the state legislature had amended the corporate 
statute.”). 
 137. For a description of one such system known as “holacracy,” see BRIAN J. 
ROBERTSON, HOLACRACY: THE NEW MANAGEMENT SYSTEM FOR A RAPIDLY CHANGING 
WORLD (2015); Ethan Bernstein et al., Beyond the Holacracy Hype, HARV. BUS. 
REV. 38 (July–Aug. 2016). 
 138. See Anthony J. Casey & M. Todd Henderson, The Boundaries of “Team” 
Production of Corporate Governance, 38 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 365, 367 (2015) (“Real 
governance power lies elsewhere, and largely outside of the gaze of modern 
corporate law scholarship.”). 
 139. See Peter J. Wiedenbeck, “Ninety-Five Percent of [Them] Will Not Be 
Missed”: Recovering the Tax Shelter Limitation Aspect of ERISA, 6 DREXEL L. REV. 
515, 517 (2014) (discussing ERISA’s “preferential tax treatment on plans 
providing retirement savings to a broad cross-section of the workforce”). 
766 74 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 739 (2017) 
The siren call of a citation from the Chancery Court is strong. 
But progressive corporate law scholars have for too long focused on 
copacetic judicial opinions as the highest metric of success. 
Instead, we must look to facilitate different governance structures 
and encourage those models that best provide more meaningful 
participation.140 We should look to the theory of the firm for our 
methodological foundation, but we should also look to real world 
companies to provide concrete examples of the kinds of 
organization we want to champion. 
V. Conclusion 
My thanks to Lyman Johnson and David Millon for their 
foundational opposition to mainstream corporate law and 
economics. The lessons of their research are manifold and 
long-lasting, and I look forward to engaging with their work for 
years to come. But the progressive corporate law movement has hit 
something of a dead end. We must move our methodological 
attention to the theory of the firm, focus on the role of employees 
within the corporation, and reimagine the basic power structures 
that frame corporate law. If we do these things, we will have a true 
alternative to shareholder primacy, along with a bedrock of 
interdisciplinary research to back it up. 
                                                                                                     
 140. See Justin Blount, Creating A Stakeholder Democracy Under Existing 
Corporate Law, 18 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 365, 370 (2016) (setting forth “different 
methods for how a stakeholder governed corporate structure could be created 
under this extant legal structure”). 
